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THE MIXED CASE FOR A PTAB OFF-
RAMP
SAURABH VISHNUBHAKAT*
This Essay begins from the emerging agenda in the political branches
for reforming various aspects of the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
and focuses on a particular reform: the creation of a PTAB off-ramp
whereby a patent being challenged in an administrative revocation
proceeding could be removed into a system primarily aimed at amending its
claims and preserving its validity. To put the proposal into perspective, the
Essay presents specific empirical trends, largely unexplored until now, that
implicate patent reliance interests to which the PTAB has done injury.
Ultimately, because the benefits and costs from a PTAB off-ramp are mixed,
it should not come at the political expense of other more basic or feasible
reforms.
* Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law; Associate Professor, Texas A&M
University Dwight Look College of Engineering; Fellow, Duke Law Center for Innovation Policy. The
author was formerly an expert advisor at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The arguments
in this writing are the author's and should not be imputed to the USPTO or to any other organization.
Sincere thanks to Arti Rai, Greg Reilly, and participants of the 2018 Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP
Review as well as the 2019 USC Gould School of Law Conference on "Reforming Patent Reform" for
helpful discussions and comments.
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INTRODUCTION
It has now been six years since the PTAB began conducting adversarial
revocation proceedings under the America Invents Act ("AIA").) In that
time, the PTAB has gone through three important developments that now
suggest the time is right for reevaluation and potential reform. First and most
importantly, the PTAB's intake of over 9,000 cases has produced a rich
source of data to test many of the empirical assumptions and predictions that
motivated the creation of PTAB review. 2 Along the way, major structural
choices by the Patent Office in implementing PTAB review have also
undergone judicial scrutiny in the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court,
over a long enough time period to allow learning and retrenchment by the
courts. 3 Most recently, changeovers in leadership have also begun to effect
reversals in the Patent Office's own policy regarding the PTAB.4
Political developments confirm the appetite for reform. From within the
agency, a rule issued last autumn5 to change the PTAB's standard for claim
construction away from the broadest-reasonable-interpretation approach to
the district courts' Phillips approach, which a number of scholars have urged
as a superior alternative.6 This policy reversal is particularly notable because
the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. v. Lee specifically
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (2011).
2. The empirical literature on the PTAB is significant and growing. See, e.g., Saurabh
Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2016); Jarrad Wood & Jonathan Stroud, Three Hundred Nos: An Empirical
Analysis of the First 300+ Denials of Institution for Inter Partes and Covered Business Method Patent
Reviews Prior to In Re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 112
(2015); Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Renewed Efficiency in Administrative Patent
Revocation, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Brian J. Love et al., Determinants of Patent Quality:
Evidence from Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 67 (2019).
3. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Disguised Patent Policymaking, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (discussing the initially permissive and subsequently restrictive arc of Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court responses to the Patent Office view of its own nonappealable discretion).
4. Andrei lancu, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, The Role of U.S. Patent Policy in
Domestic Innovation and Potential Impacts on Investment, Address before U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Patent Policy Conference (Apr. 11, 2018) (transcript available at perma.cc/6Y2E-VTVD) (discussing
patent-eligible subject matter and administrative revocation as agency priorities for reevaluation).
5. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51340 (Oct. 11, 2018).
6. E.g., Letter from John R. Allison, et al., Response to the Proposed "Changes to the Claim
Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial Appeal
Board", 3 Fed. Reg. 21221 (May 9, 2018), to USPTO (July 9, 2018), available at
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3211380 (citing Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 2). See also Michael
Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 192-204 (2007)
(criticizing the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard even in initial patent examination).
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held that the Patent Office's then-governing BRI approach was a reasonable
exercise of the agency's discretion under the Chevron framework.7
From Congress, meanwhile, proposals have emerged that take specific
aim at various aspects of the PTAB. For example, the STRONGER Patents
Act, introduced last year in the Senate, and again this year in the House,
would, among other things, create the same presumption of validity in PTAB
review as there is in district court litigation, require clear and convincing
evidence to rebut it, create a standing requirement for inter partes review,
and substantially scale back the nonappealability of initial PTAB decisions
whether to institute review.8 This year's Hatch-Waxman Integrity Act would
limit the use of the PTAB against patents listed in the FDA Orange Book,
primarily by forcing a choice between district court litigation under the
Hatch-Waxman Act or the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
on one hand, and PTAB review on the other hand.9
This Essay examines a proposal in the same vein of PTAB reform which
has received less widespread attention so far. That proposal is to create an
off-ramp from the PTAB. A patent could be removed from the administrative
trial setting, such as an inter partes review, and placed into a more
examination-like setting whose primary purpose would be to correct defects
in the patent rather than invalidate it altogether. A specific form of the off-
ramp proposal was sketched out by leading patent attorney John White in
late 2016.10 A discretionary form of the idea appears in the STRONGER
Patents Act." And in its most recent round of PTAB Annual Judicial
Conferences and a subsequent request for comments in the Federal Register,
the Patent Office also signaled its interest more generally in some form of an
off-ramp from the administrative litigation setting and sought public input
on it.12
7. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144-45 (2016).
8. Support Technology & Research for Our Nation's Growth and Economic Resilience Patents
Act, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 1390, 115th Cong. § 102 (2017).
9. Hatch-Waxman Integrity Act, H.R. 990, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 344, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
10. John White, Curing the PTAB: How 3 Fixes Will Make a Better, Fairer Process, JPWATCHDOG
(Dec. 20, 2016), perma.cc/93KB-JUCZ.
11. Support Technology & Research for Our Nation's Growth and Economic Resilience Patents
Act, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 1390, 115th Cong. § 102(i)(1) (2017).(providing for an expedited
patentability report in the discretion of the PTAB).
12. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SHARING INSIGHTS: FROM BENCH TO BAR AND BAR TO
BENCH 166-67, PTAB Annual Judicial Conferences (June 28-July 31, 2018), perma.cc/N8R3-Q5DU;
Request for Comments on Motion To Amend Practice and Procedures in Trial Proceedings Under the
America Invents Act Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 54319 (Oct. 29, 2018).
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I. RELIANCE INTERESTS AND THE PTAB
The motivations for reform include, in significant part, a sense that
PTAB review disproportionately affects patent owners who are individual
inventors and small businesses. Closely related is the view that protections
written into the AIA itself to safeguard against abuses were improperly
implemented, to the detriment of patent owners and their reliance on stable
patent rights. This view is now increasingly voiced in policy discussions 13
and court filings, 14 as well as popular media.15
Specific examples of these premises repay closer empirical scrutiny.
This Part presents the results of a new study of inter partes review cases from
the beginning of PTAB review through June 2018-more than 8,000 cases
involving nearly 4,900 patents in all. 16 This case information was further
merged with research data published by the USPTO Office of the Chief
Economist, which contains a wide range of bibliographic application data.17
The results, which are presented in Subparts A and B as follow, are a striking
set of new findings about the effect of PTAB review upon reliance interests
in the patent system that predate the enactment of the AIA.
A. Small Entities and Their Patents
Among patent owners, small entities have borne an outsized share of
inter partes review challenges. 8 Overall, 25.8 percent of the petitions filed
through June 2018, have been against patents owned by small entities. By
contrast, the expected share of petitions that should have been filed against
13. See, e.g., Comments of the Small Business Technology Council, No. PTO-P-2018-0036 (U.S.
Patent & Trademark Off., July 9, 2018); Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council Comments on
USPTO 's Proposed Changes to the Claim Construction Standard Used in PTAB Proceedings, No. PTO-
P-2018-0036 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., July 9, 2018).
14. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae US Inventor, Inc. and 31 Other Grass Roots Inventor
Organizations in Support of Petitioner, Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, No.
16-712 (S. Ct., Aug. 29, 2017); Brief of Amici Curiae Patent-Practicing Technology Innovators in
Support of Petitioner, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446 (S. Ct., Feb. 29, 2016).
15. See, e.g., Hon. Kathleen O'Malley, Hon. David Kappos, Gary Lauder, Hon. Paul Michel, and
Jamie Simpson, IP, Antitrust, and Innovation Policy - Enabling the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 2018
LeadershIP Symposium (Apr. 10, 2018), bit.ly/2xbZ5Eb; Josh Malone, PTAB Reform: An Urgent
Request on Behalf of Independent Inventors, IPWATCHDOG (May 7, 2018), perma.cc/3UNJ-USQ5.
16. Data on PTAB cases was obtained from Docket Navigator. See docketnavigator.com.
17. See Patent Examination Research Dataset ("Public PAIR"), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, perma.cc/L8BT-JW5P (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
18. For present purposes, a small entity is defined as the Patent Office defines it under 37 C.F.R. §
1.27. Micro entities were not included both because they make up a negligible share of patent owners in
inter partes review and because the recent creation of that category, see Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 10(b) (2011), means there is no relevant historical baseline.
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small-entity patents over this period is 22.2 percent.19 Viewed over time, this
disparity has often been greater, exceeding the expecting share by as much
as half or three-fourths. This comparison is summarized in Figure 1.
The disparity has important distributive implications. Small entities,
especially start-ups, rely substantially more on patent protection to secure
competitive advantage in the market, to obtain venture capital and other
financing, and to establish reputation,20 as well as to maintain leverage in
cross-licensing negotiations, leverage that would otherwise be reserved for
firms who enjoy greater size and incumbency.21 This disproportionately
greater reliance on patents means that the burden of PTAB review would still
hit small entities harder if small-entity patent owners were brought into the
PTAB at the same rate, or even a somewhat lower rate, as compared to the
rate at which small entities receive patents generally. That they are brought
into the PTAB at a higher rate is even stronger evidence of the burden.
This is not to say, of course, that being a small entity makes one's patent
less deserving of scrutiny. A questionable patent is no less questionable
because a sympathetic owner asserts it. The AIA's grand bargain in creating
adversarial post-issuance review, however, rested in significant-and
historically sustained-part on the opportunity for patent owners to preserve
the validity of their patents through amendment rather than the all-or-nothing
proposition of adjudicating validity in district court litigation. 22 This
19. The expected share was determined by calculating the share of all issued patents that issued to
small entities in each respective year when the patents now being challenged in inter partes review were
issued. For example, in September 2012, 17 inter partes review petitions were filed in total. The following
are the years of issue of the challenged patents and the small-entity share of all issued patents from that
year:
Year 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2009 2010 2011
Patent 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 3
Small- 0.305 0.274 0.257 0.230 0.234 0.232 0.229 0.206 0.203 0.201
Entity
Share
Thus, for these 17 petitions, the expected share of small-entity patents should be 3.98 (the dot-product of
rows 2 and 3). The share observed is 4. This calculation was done for each of the 70 months from
September 2012, through June 2018, inclusive.
20. See Stuart J.H. Graham, et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1262-63 (2009).
21. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted M. Sichelman, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 120-21 (2010).
22. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., at 6
(2004) (statement of James A. Toupin, USPTO General Counsel) (testifying that "By providing for the
possibility of amendment of challenged claims, the proposed system would preserve the merited benefits
of patent claims better than the win-all or lose-all validity contests in district court.").
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assurance, that PTAB review was about preserving patent claims by
amendment where possible and not solely about invalidating them, was
naturally of great importance to patent owners in general, and to small
entities in particular.
Nevertheless, until October 2017, the Patent Office practice as to
proposed amendments in inter partes review was to impose the burden on
patent owners to show patentability even though the petitioner in PTAB
proceedings generally bears the burden to prove unpatentability.23 The
likelihood that amendments would actually be allowed, meanwhile, has been
low from the start.24 Understood in this context, the disproportionate
targeting in inter partes review of patents owned by small entities represents
one of the more problematic injuries from current PTAB practice upon
reliance interests in the patent system.
B. Retroactivity Against Existing Patents
Another such reliance injury has been to owners of patents that were
sought, prosecuted, and issued before the first-inventor-to-file ("FITF")
provisions of the AIA went into effect. The FITF regime is an important
reference point because it differentiates post-grant review from inter partes
and covered business method review. 25 Post-grant review applies to all FITF
patents and only to them, 26 and thus, it is the AIA's only revocation
mechanism that is solely prospective. By contrast, inter partes review works
with express retroactive force upon all patents regardless of whether they
were issued "before, on, or after" the effective date of the AIA. 2 7
It is unsurprising, then, that at the start of inter partes review, i.e., a year
after the AIA was enacted but still six months before the FITF regime went
into effect, all petitions were against past, pre-AIA patents. The share of
petitions for inter partes review that challenge post-FITF patents has grown
over time and, as of June 2018, makes up 37.5 percent of such petitions.
What may be surprising, however, is just how far back into the historical
register of patent rights inter partes review has, in fact, reached.
23. Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
24. A series of internal studies by the USPTO, further discussed below, have repeatedly confirmed
the low likelihood that patent owner requests to amend will be granted. See infra notes 78-79 and
accompanying text.
25. The effective date for FITF patents was set at March 16,2013, or 18 months from the enactment
of the AIA on September 16, 2011. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 3(n)(1).
26. See id. § 6(f)(2)(A).
27. See id. § 6(c)(2)(A).
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The share of inter partes review petitions that challenge FITF patents
has grown from zero to 37.5 percent. By contrast, the share of petitions that
challenge pre-AIA patents that would have been subject merely to inter
partes reexamination ("IPX") has persistently been much larger. It began at
around 64.9 percent and remained above the 60 percent mark for the first
four years of inter partes review. Since then and at the most recent count, it
remains above 50 percent. Finally, a notable share of petitions have also
attacked patents so old that they would not have been eligible even for inter
partes reexamination. That share was initially 35.1 percent of petitions for
inter partes review and has been slow to decline, remaining above 10 percent
until just this past year. Figures 2 and 3 summarize these trends.
The comparison to inter partes reexamination is particularly salient
because one of the cardinal defenses against the charge of retroactivity in the
PTAB is that inter partes review does not really frustrate reliance interests
in any meaningful sense. 28 The reason for this is that a dozen years before
the AIA, the 1999 American Inventors Protection Act ("AIPA") established
the system of inter partes reexamination for the Patent Office to reevaluate
and, if appropriate, revoke issued patents in a process that included the
adversarial participation of third parties. 29 Inter partes review may be a
different regime in form, the argument goes but is the same in structure and
function as inter partes reexamination. Thus, those who filed and obtained
their patents subject to the latter can be deemed to be sufficiently on notice
as to the former.
This view is pragmatic and defensible but invites reasonable
disagreement. It is true that reexamination under the AIPA was adversarial,
in the sense that the third-party requester could participate and respond in
each round of briefing and argumentation.3 0 The focus of the proceeding,
however, remained the dialogue between the patent owner and the
reexaminer, a dialogue conducted "according to the procedures established
for initial examination."3 1 Indeed, the Patent Office appeared to view the
system as different in kind from district court proceedings, expressly
28. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371, 1374
(2018) (likening the old system of inter partes reexamination to the current system of inter partes review
and concluding that under both systems, patents were, and are, granted subject to the same "authority to
reexamine-and perhaps cancel-a patent claim").
29. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 §§ 4601-4608 (1999). See
Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 2, at 57-58.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (1999); MPEP § 2654 (describing the conduct of inter partes reexamination
proceedings).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (1999).
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cautioning that inter partes reexaminations "do not countenance so-called
'litigation tactics. "'32
The patentee-reexaminer dialogue, meanwhile, was concerned chiefly
with vetting and, wherever possible, preserving, by amendment, the validity
of claims on which a "substantial new question" of patentability had arisen
since the initial agency examination concluded. 33 It was subject to this
regime that parties had sought and obtained their patents after the AIPA, only
to learn-more than a decade later-that other sufficient conditions for
revocation could still be created and applied against their patents. A fortiori,
the patents issued before the AIPA that were not subject even to inter partes
reexamination have suffered and continue to suffer an ever greater reversal
of reliance interests in the current system of inter partes review. 34
II. DESIGNING AN OFF-RAMP
The difficulties that inter partes review has imposed against patents
owned by small entities and those issued prior to the AIA, and even prior to
the AIPA, share a common feature: difficulty in amending patent claims to
preserve their validity. The proposal of a PTAB off-ramp aims specifically
at redressing this difficulty.
A. Existing Patent Office Authority
The off-ramp design that John White first proposed in 2016 35 is a fairly
straightforward concept and thus is the starting point of the present analysis.
The depth with which the Patent Office has recently engaged with the idea
builds from a similar starting point. The basic proposal was as follows:
1. Promptly after a petition for PTAB review is filed, the patent owner
could seek reissue. 36
32. MPEP § 2609.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999).
34. The case of ex parte reexamination, which has been in place since 1980, is mixed. To date, all
patents subjected to inter partes review under the AIA were issued after exparte reexamination, meaning
that the owners of these patents sought and obtained them subject to some form of administrative
reevaluation. Nevertheless, differences between AIA review and this earlier administrative review system
are no less relevant than with inter partes reexamination. Ex parte reexamination was also concerned
quite consciously with a renewed examiner-patentee dialogue with sustained opportunity to preserve
validity by amendment. Moreover, exparte reexamination could be brought by the patent owner itself as
a way of shoring up the defensibility of its own patent, whereas modern PTAB reviews specifically
exclude patent owners from bringing such petitions under the AIA.
35. See John White, Curing the PTAB: How 3 Fixes Will Make a Better, Fairer Process,
IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 20, 2016), perma.cc/93KB-JUCZ.
36. Id.
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2. Upon the patent owner's application for reissue, the petition for
PTAB review would be stayed.3 7
3. The reissue examiner would conduct that proceeding based on well-
established agency practice38 that is oriented toward correcting the scope of
the patent claims while preserving their validity.3 9
4. Notably, the reissue examiner would also determine any intervening
rights that might arise as a result.40
The principal feature of this approach is that the agency could
implement it under existing statutory authority, which provides that "if
another proceeding or matter involving the patent is before the Office, the
Director may determine the manner in which the inter partes review or other
proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing for stay, transfer,
consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding." 41 Indeed,
this provision expressly refers to the statute authorizing reissue
proceedings. 42
There is, however, an additional feature in the original proposal that is
probably beyond the Patent Office's authority to implement. Not only would
all PTAB review of a patent undergoing reissue be stayed, but district-court
litigation involving the patent would also be dismissed without prejudice,
ostensibly to preserve a defendant-petitioner's right to refile. 43 Dismissing
court actions is, of course, beyond agency power. Indeed, even staying
district court actions would be difficult. The statutes governing PTAB review
provide for mandatory or presumptive litigation stays in certain situations,
but these stays leave intact the considerable discretion of courts to grant or
deny stays themselves. 44
In fact, even if courts were willing to dismiss without prejudice in such
cases, the benefit to PTAB petitioners who seek inter partes review after
being sued in district court would still be minimal. The one-year time bar,
which requires a party that has been served with a complaint alleging
infringement to seek inter partes review within one year or forgo it entirely,
37. Id.
38. 37 C.F.R. §§1.171-1.179.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 315(d). There is correspondingly broad authority as to post-grant review as well.
See 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
42. Id. (cross-referencing 35 U.S.C. § 251).
43. See White, supra note 35.
44. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(2), 325(a)(2); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29
§ 18(b).
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still applies to such petitioners. 45 And, as the en banc Federal Circuit recently
explained, dismissal without prejudice of the district court case does not reset
or toll the one-year bar. 46 Thus, holding a defendant-petitioner's rights in
abeyance during reissue, without prejudicing its right to challenge the patent
later, would require curbing judicial case management discretion as well as
a restructuring of the one-year time bar-neither of which the Patent Office
currently has authority to do.
The Patent Office, for its part, has elaborated on the basic off-ramp
concept with two further institutional design considerations. The starting
point for the agency, as for Mr. White's proposal, is to involve examiners
rather than rely solely on the administrative patent judges of the PTAB. 47
Going further, the agency asks whether the involvement of the examiner
should be mandatory (as the use of reissue practice seems to assume) or
invoked upon request, such as through an advisory report from the
examiner. 48 And if it should be upon request, should that request come from
the patent owner, from the petitioner, from either party, from both parties
jointly, or from the PTAB panel itself? 49
It is notable that the Patent Office's own proposal frames the use of
examiners as an adjunct to the work of the PTAB in evaluating motions to
amend.5 0 It does not contemplate handing the patent off to a distinct
proceeding (albeit still inside the agency) the way Mr. White's basic proposal
does. The significance of this framing is that the Patent Office is likely quite
attentive to the overarching constraints on PTAB adjudication, especially the
one-year statutory deadline for issuing final written decisions,5 1 and is
inclined to keep the PTAB in control of the overall timeline.
B. The Effect of Aqua Products
The PTAB -centric approach to involving examiners in the preservation
of patent validity means that the off-ramp concept that the Patent Office is
now considering is situated in the context of a motion to amend. The most
45. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
46. Click-To-Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d 1321, 1328 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
47. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SHARING INSIGHTS: FROM BENCH TO BAR AND BAR TO
BENCH 166, PTAB Annual Judicial Conferences (June 28-July 31, 2018), perma.cc/N8R3-Q5DU.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Request for Comments on Motion To Amend Practice and Procedures in Trial
Proceedings Under the America Invents Act Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg.
54319, 54323, 54325 (Oct. 29, 2019) (suggesting a various situations in which the panel may seek
examiner assistance on proposed amendments).
50. Id. at 167 (asking whether "patent examiners should be involved in assisting the Board in
addressing motions to amend") (emphasis added).
51. 35 U.S.C. §316(a)(1 1).
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salient design consideration in that context is the en banc Federal Circuit's
2017 decision in Aqua Products v. Matal, regarding who bears the burden of
proving the patentability or unpatentability of claims introduced by proposed
amendment during inter partes review. 52
In Aqua Products, the Federal Circuit held that the petitioner must bear
the burden of proving that amended claims introduced by the patent owner
are unpatentable.53 This disrupted the prior PTAB practice of imposing that
burden upon the patent owner. 54 The tension between these positions arose
from two general rules that, on their own terms, seem relatively
straightforward. The PTAB rule at issue provided that relief must generally
be sought in the form of a motion and the party who makes the motion bears
the burden of establishing that the relief is warranted.5 5 However, the
governing statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) provides that the
petitioner, not the patent owner, bears the overall burden of proving the
unpatentability of patent claims in inter partes review. 56
Importantly for considering off-ramp design, the en banc court in Aqua
Products reached its decision by overlapping plurality positions, not a single
clear majority position. The lead opinion of Judge O'Malley disapproved the
Patent Office rule and was joined by Judges Newman, Lourie, Moore, and
Wallach-with Judges Dyk and Reyna concurring in the result.57 The
separate opinion of Judge Reyna, meanwhile, found the statute ambiguous
and was joined by Judge Dyk-and joined in pertinent part by Chief Judge
Prost and Judges Taranto, Chen, and Hughes.5
The locus of overlap was Judges Reyna and Dyk's view that § 316(e)
is ambiguous but that the Patent Office did not interpret it in an APA-
compliant fashion and so does not merit Chevron deference. 59 (Judge Taranto
wrote separately-in dissent, with Chief Judge Prost and Judges Chen and
Hughes-that the agency did interpret the ambiguity in § 316(e) and did
merit Chevron deference.60) These positions are summarized in Figure 4.61
52. Aqua Prods. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc).
53. Id. at 1296.
54. Id. at 1301.
55. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
57. Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1295.
58. Id. at 1334 (Reyna, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1342 (Taranto, J., dissenting).
61. Judge Moore wrote separately, joined by Judges Newman and O'Malley, "to address problems
with the Director's attempt to extend Chevron deference beyond any prior applications of the doctrine."
Id. at 1328 (Moore, J., concurring). Judge Hughes also wrote separately, joined by Judge Chen, to argue
that the Patent Office is still entitled, if not to Chevron deference for interpreting an ambiguous statute,
to Auer deference for interpreting its own regulation, as well as to reject the view that the agency's
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The upshot of Judges Reyna and Dyk's swing-vote view is that if the Patent
Office were to engage in APA rulemaking as to who bears the burden of
establishing the patentability (or unpatentability) of amended claims, then
the 7-4 split of Aqua Products might well turn into a 6-5 majority going the
other way. 62
If the burden continues to belong to the petitioner, then examiner
involvement in evaluating amended claims should require the petitioner's
assent, and vice-versa. If, as the Patent Office has suggested, the PTAB panel
might seek examiner involvement either (1) where the petitioner has dropped
out or (2) where the panel sua sponte believes examiner input would be
useful, then the patent owner especially should have a chance to respond to
the examiner report.
Public actions, as well as empirical trends, suggest that the importance
of Aqua Products to Patent Office practice has been substantial. Following
the en banc decision on October 4, 2017, the Chief Judge of the PTAB, on
November 21, 2017, issued a guidance memorandum to all administrative
patent judges on how to implement the decision in cases both future and
pending.63 The PTAB's next round of annual judicial conferences, held in
summer 2018 at the Patent Office headquarters and its regional offices,
started gathering public input on claim amendment and the involvement of
examiners. 64 And most recently, the agency's request for comments seeks
input even more specifically oriented toward rulemaking in the manner
suggested by Judge Reyna's opinion.6 5
Indeed, cumulative data on motions to amend in the PTAB suggests that
the agency may have been attuned to the possibility of reversal even before
the opinion issued. Figure 5 shows the results of motions to amend as a
retrospective moving average from the beginning of PTAB review in late
2012 through the end of January 2019. Through late summer 2016, the rate
at which motions to amend were granted or granted-in-part had been
persistently low, at or below 4 percent. However, those rates began to grow
interpretation of § 316(e) was not an APA-compliant act of rulemaking. Id. at 1358 (Hughes, J.,
dissenting). These opinions are omitted only for clarity as to the discussion at hand.
62. See id. at 1335 (Reyna, J., concurring) (noting that his opinion "does not bar the Agency from
crafting a wholesome interpretation of the evidentiary burdens allowed under the inter partes review
statute that could be afforded deference if properly promulgated under APA rulemaking procedures").
63. David P. Ruschke, Guidance on Motions to Amend in view ofAqua Products, USPTO (Nov. 21,
2017), perma.cc/DW9N-TEA3.
64. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SHARING INSIGHTS: FROM BENCH TO BAR AND BAR TO
BENCH 166, PTAB Annual Judicial Conferences (June 28-July 31, 2018), perma.cc/N8R3-Q5DU.
65. Request for Comments on Motion To Amend Practice and Procedures in Trial Proceedings
Under the America Invents Act Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 54322, 54324-
25.
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almost immediately after the Federal Circuit in August 2016 granted the
petition for en banc rehearing in Aqua Products.
In determining how best to proceed in the wake of that case, then, the
recent request for comments poses the very questions on which the slim en
banc outcome turned: (1) should the agency engage in rulemaking to allocate
the burden of persuasion in motions to amend, and (2) if so, who should bear
the burden, the petitioner or the patent owner?66 The request for comments
also cites the PTAB guidance order of April 2018 in the Western Digital
case, which allocated the burden on the petitioner and was subsequently
designated an "informative" opinion as to different aspects of PTAB
amendment practice.67
Public response to the request for comments appears, on the whole, to
favor notice-and-comment rulemaking by the Patent Office as to amendment
practice. Leading IP groups such as the American IP Law Association, 68 the
IP Owners Association, 69 and the IP Law Section of the American Bar
Association70 support notice-and-comment rulemaking. So do leading
industry groups such as the Biotechnology Innovation Organization71 and the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 72 Those who believe patent
owners should bear the burden also favor rulemaking as the preferred means
to restore pre-Aqua Products practice, including the Computer &
Communications Industry Association 73 and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.74 And leading individual commentators on the patent system,
66. Id.
67. W. Dig. Corp. v. SPEX Techs., Inc. No. IPR2018-00082, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B Apr. 25, 2018).
68. Letter from Sheldon H. Klein, President, American Intellectual Property Law Association to
Judge Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent Judge, and Michael
Tierney, Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Dec. 20, 2018), perma.cc/JAT6-6PPY.
69. Letter from Henry Hadad, President, Intellectual Property Owners Association to Judge
Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent Judge, and Michael Tierney, Vice
Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Dec. 21, 2018), perma.cc/ZDQ2-2NG6.
70. Letter from Mark K. Dickson, Chair, ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law to Judge
Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent Judge, and Michael Tierney, Vice
Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Dec. 13, 2018), perma.cc/58RU-V7T3.
71. Letter from Hans Sauer, Deputy General Counsel & VP for Intellectual Property, Biotechnology
Innovation Organization to Judge Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent
Judge, and Michael Tierney, Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Dec. 21, 2018), perma.cc/M5YR-
9Q4E.
72. Letter from Ron D. Katznelson, Vice Chair for Patents, Intellectual Property Committee, and
Brendan B. Godfrey, Vice President for Government Relations, IEEE-USA to Judge Jacqueline Wright
Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent Judge, and Michael Tierney, Vice Chief
Administrative Patent Judge (Dec. 21, 2018), perma.cc/E43U-L2X6.
73. Letter from Joshua Landau, Patent Counsel, Computer & Communications Industry Association
to Judge Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent Judge, and Michael
Tierney, Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Dec. 21, 2018), perma.cc/222F-B9LQ.
74. Letter from Daniel Nazer, Senior Staff Attorney, and Alex Moss, Staff Attorney, Electronic
Frontier Foundation to Judge Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent
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such as former Eli Lilly general counsel and former AIPLA President Robert
Armitage, favor rulemaking as well. 75 Together, these authorities indicate a
consensus. This consensus, together with information-gathering that the
Patent Office has already done, suggests that a proposed rulemaking
probably is in the offing. As for who should bear the burden as a result of
such rulemaking, there is not a consensus, but there is apparent majority
support for placing the burden on the petitioner,'7 6 as would be in accordance
with Judge O'Malley's lead opinion in Aqua Products.
In general, to avoid gamesmanship, a party-driven invocation of
examiner involvement should probably require the assent of whichever party
bears the burden of persuasion. For example, if Patent Office rulemaking
codifies Western Digital, that the burden belongs to the petitioner, then the
patent owner should not be able to disrupt the petitioner's case by unilaterally
introducing an examiner into the process. Conversely, and for the same
reason, if the rulemaking restores the pre-Aqua Products allocation that the
burden belongs to the patent owner, then the petitioner should not be able to
disrupt the patent owner's defense of its own amended claims through the
tactical and idiosyncratic use of agency resources.
However, if examiner participation is either mandatory or at the
discretion of the panel (rather than the parties), then the allocation of the
burden will likely not matter as much. In those circumstances, the
involvement of the examiner would be akin to the involvement of a
magistrate judge to address certain issues in district court litigation, with no
particularly party-specific avenue for inappropriate strategic behavior.
Instead, the mandatory or panel-initiated use of examiners to evaluate
the patentability of amended claims should assure ample opportunity for a
response to the recommended conclusions of the examiner. It would be
appropriate, of course, to take briefing both from the petitioner and from the
patent owner, but as a matter of basic due process, the opportunity of the
patent owner would be the more important one to guarantee.
III. THE MIXED CASE
The likely contours of a PTAB off-ramp, both as attorney John White
has proposed, and as the Patent Office has explored and continues to explore,
Judge, and Michael Tierney, Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Dec. 20, 2018), perma.cc/6HVK-
QEJQ.
75. Letter from Robert A. Armitage to Judge Jacqueline Wright Bonilla, Acting Deputy Chief
Administrative Patent Judge, and Michael Tierney, Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judge (Nov. 7,
2018), perma.cc/J7MT-ND8E.
76. See supra notes 65-69, 72.
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are chiefly concerned with the difficulty of preserving patent claims, where
possible, through amendment. Evaluating the institutional design of a PTAB
off-ramp in terms of amendment practice, meanwhile, requires considering
not only the landscape of current practice after Aqua Products but also the
agency's relatively high likelihood of rulemaking in the near term. The result
of this evaluation is ultimately equivocal, with worthy arguments on both
sides of the cost-benefit ledger.
A. Benefits
The principal benefit of an off-ramp from PTAB reviews under the
AIA, as noted above,'7 7 would be that it would adhere to the preservation of
patents to the extent that their claims are salvageable through amendment.
Certainly, it would adhere more closely to that goal than does the current
observed practice of the PTAB in granting motions to amend. The Patent
Office has now published four internal studies of the results of motions to
amend, each a cumulative analysis from the start of PTAB review in late
2012.78 Each study has shown that a panel's likelihood of denying a motion
to amend consistently been at or higher than 90 percent.79
Even now, over a year after the Aqua Products decision, the cumulative
rate as of January 2019 for full denial of motions to amend remains about
91.2 percent. 0 The 12-month average rate as of January 2019 for full denial
is only slightly more generous at 84.8 percent." Indeed, notwithstanding that
the burden of persuasion has now been reallocated away from patent owners,
Figure 6 shows that even the overall number of motions to amend has
remained relatively flat apart from a temporary uptick after the PTAB issued
its post-Aqua Products guidance. This followed a marked decline in such
77. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
78. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MOTION TO AMEND
STUDY (Apr. 30, 2016), bit.ly/2vrJMoY [hereinafter MTA Study #1]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MOTION TO AMEND STUDY: INSTALLMENT 2 (May 31,
2017), bit.1y/2LMuiXY [hereinafter MTA Study #2]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MOTION TO AMEND STUDY: INSTALLMENT 3 (Sept. 30, 2017),
bit.ly/2n6xKOl [hereinafter MTA Study #3]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD MOTION TO AMEND STUDY: INSTALLMENT 4 (Mar. 31, 2018), bit.1y/2LXiS2E
[hereinafter MTA Study #4].
79. MTA Study #1, supra note 78, at 6; MTA Study #2, supra note 78, at 6; MTA Study #3, supra
note 78, at 6; MTA Study #4, supra note 78, at 7.
80. Data on motions to amend is available from the Docket Navigator service, docketnavigator.com.
Rates were calculated based on motions to amend that were (1) granted in full, (2) denied in full, or (3)
granted in part and denied in part. Excluded from the analysis were 14 motions to amend (out of 208
total) that were either denied as moot or denied without prejudice.
8 1. Id.
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requests during 2015 when the numbers of motions to amend were at an all-
time high, but (as Figure 5 shows) so were the rates of full denial.
A second key benefit of an off-ramp from the adversarial PTAB setting
would be that a disinterested examiner assessment of amended or substitute
claims is likely to be preferable over highly partial arguments from a
petitioner. Although PTAB review is, by design, cheaper and more broadly
accessible than litigation,8 2 the selection of petitioners into administrative
patent revocation is still driven primarily by direct self-interest. Of
petitioners who seek inter partes review, for example, 70 percent have
previously been sued in U.S. district court for infringing the patent that they
seek to revoke in the PTAB.83 Covered business method review is even more
directly defensive, and only those who have been sued for, or charged with,
infringement of the patent in question (or their privies or real parties in
interest) are permitted to seek review.8 4
The incentives of PTAB petitioners may be well-suited for testing the
validity of already-issued patent claims as, indeed, the more robustly
adversarial structure of AIA review reflects. Yet the narrow, result-oriented
arguments typical of patent litigation are inapt for patent claims being
evaluated for the first time. For this, the approach of examiners, especially
the highly experienced examiners who serve in the Central Reexamination
Unit of the Patent Office 5 is at one remove from the immediate stakes of
the dispute. Thus, it is better suited to evaluate the innovation- and
disclosure-related merits of the proposed amended claims in light of the prior
art in the relevant field or fields of technology. In fact, the use of examiners
that the Patent Office mentioned in its recent request for comments referred
specifically to examiners from the Central Reexamination Unit for the
preparation of an advisory report to the PTAB panel on the patentability of
amended claims. 6
Thus, whether the Patent Office were to send a patent into a distinct
proceeding for reissue or keep it in PTAB review and merely invite an
impartial advisory report on patentability, the benefits would be a more
amendment-friendly process in accord with a key assurance of the AIA, and
the more dispassionate perspective of a seasoned examiner.
82. Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 2, at 51-55.
83. Id. at 73.
84. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 18(a)(1)(B).
85. USPTO, Central Reexamination Unit, bit.ly/2V9ZArM (noting that "[t]he CRU is staffed with
senior primary patent examiners and supervisory patent examiners having a wide range of technical
expertise and advanced patent legal knowledge.").
86. Request for Comments on Motion To Amend Practice and Procedures in Trial Proceedings
Under the America Invents Act Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 54319, 54323.
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B. Costs
Nevertheless, against these benefits, significant costs must also be
acknowledged. The most salient is delay. Whether a patent validity review
in the PTAB is held in abeyance pending a reissue proceeding, or the PTAB
panel itself awaits the preparation of an examiner advisory report,
introducing a new institutional actor midstream will lengthen the review
process. This result is especially likely in certain subsets of cases, such as
those involving unusually complex or valuable technologies, a large number
of patent claims, or a large number of parties-simply because the incentive
and scope for potential amendments will be correspondingly greater.
For example, prior research has shown that inter partes review petitions
against "Drugs & Medical"-related patents are especially prone to strategic
joinder. 7 In that technology, a minority of petitioners (48.5 percent) are
"standard petitioners," i.e., they have previously been sued on the patent that
they now challenge." However, a significant majority of petitions (70.8
percent) in that technology contain at least one standard petitioner.8 9 In other
words, those who are not prior defendants frequently join petitions of those
who are. 90
For the Patent Office, this problem of delay, and potentially significant
delay, is not only a general matter of promoting expeditious resolution in
service of social welfare. It is also an explicit statutory obligation. All three
types of patent validity reviews under the AIA must be concluded within one
year of institution, and even the discretion of the Director to extend the
adjudication period "for good cause shown" is limited only to an additional
six months. 91 Making advisory input from examiners a routine part of
amendment practice would quickly push review to the outer limits of these
deadlines and would threaten the agency's ability to meet its obligations.
A second major cost of more elaborate and examiner-oriented
amendment practice is its potential effect on judicial stays and court-agency
substitution more generally. The problem of stays pending PTAB review has
beguiled litigants on both sides from the start. District courts have been
highly variable in the rates at which they stay cases, from as frequently as 70
87. Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 2, at 74.
88. Id. at 74, 102 (Figure 15a).
89. Id. at 74, 103 (Figure 15b).
90. Id. at 74.
91. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(1 1), 326(a)(1 1).
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percent in the Northern District of California to as rarely as 40 percent or
less in the Eastern District of Texas according to one recent estimate. 92
In large part, this was due to the Patent Office's doctrine of partial
institution, whereby a petition might not be fully granted or fully denied but
granted in part and denied in part. 93 It was only recently, with the Supreme
Court's April 2018 decision in SAS Institute v. Iancu, that partial institution
was abolished, so that the PTAB must now make only binary decisions on
each petition. 94 This change points to an abruptly clearer informational signal
from the PTAB to the courts about what issues are likely to be simplified if
the agency grants review, and what issues are likely to remain for the courts
if the agency denies review.95 A more protracted PTAB process, however,
would push the pendulum back toward greater uncertainty, and for longer,
on the part of courts regarding the validity of the patents at bar. The rational
but socially undesirable response of courts, in turn, would be to deny stays
more often and with greater variation once again.
A third cost, somewhat more elusive but no less important for that, is
the problem of trying to fix a dramatic administrative expansion of the patent
system by compounding its complexity and, likely, its cost. As Professor
John Duffy argued in the months leading up to the enactment of the AIA,
"one might fairly [have] question[ed] whether the substantial expansion of
Patent Office's bureaucratic proceedings over the past three decades has
been a good thing or not," but the even further expansion that the AIA
brought about reflected "something truly unprecedented in the history of
U.S. patent law." 96
Closely tied to the problem of bureaucratic expansion is that the fee-
setting authority granted to the Patent Office allowed it to "raise its fees to
fuel its own growth." 97 The agency must set its fees at cost recovery-i.e.,
patent fees can be no higher than is necessary to recover the costs related to
the agency's patent-related activities. 98 The potential for moral hazard is
plain. Fees may rise so long as agency activities expand to justify them.99
The problems of expansion and cost are predictably difficult to parse because
92. Joel Sayres & Julie Wahlstrand, To Stay or Not to Stay Pending IPR? That Should Be a Simpler
Question, 17 CHl.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. I PTAB BAR Assoc. 52, 63-65 (2018).
93. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108, 42.208 (2012).
94. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Jancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
95. Vishnubhakat, supra note 2, at 26-27.
96. John F. Duffy, The Big Government Patent Bill 1, PATENTLYO (June 23, 2011),
perma.cc/TU76-DL7R.
97. Id.
98. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 10(a)(2).
99. See Duffy, supra note 96, at 3 (predicting that "the inflation of fees will track the inflation of
the bureaucracy. It will do nothing to check the growth of the bureaucracy.").
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reforming PTAB amendment practice effectively will likely require
significant agency resources. Doing it well will be costly, but doing it
cheaply may render it so ineffectual that doing it badly may prove worse than
doing nothing at all.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the case for a PTAB off-ramp is unclear for much
the same reason that administrative patent revocation under the AIA has been
troublesome in the first place. At its core, the design of the PTAB is to make
it easier to invalidate poor-quality patents, but to do so, it must necessarily
make it easier to invalidate all patents-in the hope that the punishments at
the end would fall disproportionately on poor-quality patents.100 Although
this problem could be managed, it could not be avoided entirely because
poor-quality patents cannot reliably be identified up front; if they could, there
would be no need for review at all. 101
The inverse is also true. Procedures that make it easier to preserve the
validity of particular patents unavoidably make it easier to preserve the
validity of all patents by diminishing the relative cost-savings associated
with PTAB review for petitioners who otherwise seek a cheaper, faster, and
more expert alternative than the district courts for litigating the validity of
patents.
The mixed case for a PTAB off-ramp should give pause to institutional
designers both in the Patent Office and in Congress. Recent doctrinal
retrenchments from the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have already
begun to scale back some of the more expansive and problematic positions
of the Patent Office concerning PTAB structure, offering a positive way
forward. 102 Meanwhile, renewed enthusiasm in the Patent Office for other,
more foundational issues such as PTAB claim construction 03 and the
doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter'1 have largely met with public
approval and success. The resurgent but finite political capital of the Patent
100. Federal Trade Commission Hearing No. 4 on Competition and Consumer Protection, Session]:
Emerging Trends in Patent Quality (Oct. 24, 2018) (testimony of Saurabh Vishnubhakat), bit.ly/2Ebku31.
101. Id.
102. See generally Vishnubhakat, Disguised Patent Policymaking, supra note 3 (discussing the arc
of Patent Office aggrandizement from the early days of the PTAB to more recent reversals).
103. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
104. E.g., USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan.
7, 2019);Andrei lancu, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks at the 10th Annual Patent
Law & Policy Conference (Nov. 26, 2018), bit.ly/2GWVX4y; Andrei lancu, Director, U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Remarks at the Intellectual Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting (Sept.
24, 2018), bit.ly/2xzUoEr.
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Office and the generally limited window of consensus within which patent
legislation is likely to succeed all point toward a need for cautious
prioritization. The past shortcomings of PTAB practice with respect to
preserving patents through amendment do merit reform, but this should not
come at the expense of other more basic or feasible reforms.
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Figure 3. Cohorts of Patents Challenged in Inter Partes Review
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Figure 5. Outcomes of Motions to Amend in Inter Partes Review (Retrospective
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